Quoting APFN &lt;APFN@apfn.org&gt;:

> December 7, 1941 - 'a day which will live in infamy'
> http://disc.server.com/discussion.cgi?disc=149495;article=47208;title=A
> PFN
> > THE PEARL HARBOR DECEPTION
> > http://www.apfn.org/apfn/pearl_harbor.htm
> > The Bombing of Pearl Harbor
> >
> > On the evening of December 6, 1941, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the
> > president of the United States, received a message intercepted by the
> > U.S. Navy. Sent from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in Washington, the
> > message was
> > encrypted in the top-level Japanese "purple code." But that was no
> > problem.
> > The Americans had cracked the code long before that.
> > It was imperative that the president see the message right away
> > because it
> > revealed that the Japanese, under the heavy pressure of Western
> > economic sanctions, were terminating relations with the United
> > States.
> > Roosevelt read the thirteen-part transmission, looked up and
> > announced, "This
> > means war."
> >
> > He then did a very strange thing for a president in his situation.
> >
> > Nothing.
> >
> > The Japanese secret declaration of war never reached the people who
> > needed
> > to hear it the most - Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief
> > of the
> > United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and the unit's
> > commanding
> > general, Walter Short. Pearl Harbor, it was common military
> > knowledge, was
> > where the Japanese would strike. If they struck.
> >
> > At dawn the next morning a Japanese squadron bombed Pearl Harbor
> > and the
> > surprise attack was just that, a complete surprise. At least to
> > Kimmeland
> > Short and the 4,575 American servicemen who died.
> >
> > It may not have been such a surprise to Generals George C. Marshall
> > and
> > Leonard T. Gerow and Admirals Harold R. Stark and Richmond Kelly
> > Turner.
> > They were the military's top brass in Washington and the only
officers authorized to forward such sensitive intelligence to outlying commanders. But the decoded war declaration did not reach Kimmel and Short until the morning, with the attack well underway off in the Pacific.

Marshall and Stark, supreme commanders of the U.S. Army and Navy respectively, later testified that the message was not forwarded to Kimmel and Short because the Hawaiian commanders had received so many intercepted Japanese messages that another one would simply confuse them.

Internal army and navy inquiries in 1944 held Stark and Marshall derelict of duty for keeping the Hawaiian commanders in the dark. But the military buried those findings. As far as the public knew, the final truth was uncovered by the Roberts Commission, headed by Justice Owen Roberts of the Supreme Court, and convened eleven days after the attack. Like another investigative commission headed by a Supreme Court justice on a different topic more than twenty years later, the Roberts Commission appeared to have identified its culprits in advance and gerrymandered its inquiries to make the suspects appear guilty. The scapegoats were Kimmel and Short, who were both publicly crucified, forced to retire, and denied the open hearings they desired. One of the Roberts Commission panelists, Admiral William Standley, would call Roberts's performance "crooked as a snake."

There were eight investigations of Pearl Harbor altogether. The most spectacular was a joint House-Senate probe that reiterated the Roberts Commission findings. At those hearings, Marshall and Stark testified, incredibly, that they could not remember where they were the night the war declaration came in. But a close friend of Frank Knox, the secretary of the Navy, later revealed that Knox, Stark, and Marshall spent most of that night in the White House with Roosevelt awaiting the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the chance for America to join World War II.

A widespread coverup ensued. A few days after Pearl Harbor, reports historian John Toland, Marshall told his top officers, "Gentlemen, this goes to the grave with us." General Short once considered Marshall his friend, only to learn that the chief of staff was the agent of his
frame-up.
> Short once remarked that he pitied his former pal because Marshall
> was the
> only general who wouldn't be able to write an autobiography.
>
> There were multiple warnings of the Pearl Harbor attack concealed
> from the
> commanders at Pearl Harbor. The Winds Code was perhaps the most
> shocking. That
> was an earlier transmission, in a fake weather report broadcast on a
> Japanese
> short-wave station, of the words higashi no kaze ame. Which
> means,"east wind,
> rain." The Americans already knew that this was the Japanese code for
> war with
> the United States. The response of top U.S. military officials? To
> deny that
> the "winds" message existed and to attempt to destroy all records of
> its
> reception. But it did exist. And it was received.
>
> Completely apart from the cloak and dagger of cryptography, the
> Australian intelligence service, three days before the attack, spotted the
> Japanese fleet of aircraft carriers heading for Hawaii. A warning went to
> Washington where it was dismissed by Roosevelt as a politically
> motivated
> rumor circulated by Republicans.
>
> A British double agent, Dusko Popov, who siphoned information from
> Germany, learned of the Japanese intentions and desperately tried to
> warn
> Washington, to no avail. And there were others.
>
> Why would Roosevelt and the nation's top military commanders
> sacrifice the
> U.S. Pacific Fleet, not to mention thousands of servicemen - an act
> that could
> justifiably be deemed treason? They had concluded long before Pearl
> Harbor
> that war against the Axis powers was a necessity. The American public
> would
> surely bring the public around.
>
> "This was the president's problem," wrote Rear Admiral Robert A.
> Theobald who commanded Pearl Harbor's destroyers, "and his solution
> was based
> upon the simple fact that, while it takes two to make a fight, either
> one
> may start it."
>
> "A Small group of men, revered and held to be most honorable by
> millions,"wrote Toland, "had convinced themselves that it was
> necessary to
> act dishonorably for the food of their nation - and incited the war
> that Japan
had tried to avoid."

http://www.carpenoctem.tv/cons/pearl.html

PEARL HARBOR MOTHER OF ALL CONSPIRACIES
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html

Pearl Harbor remains 'a day which will live in infamy'


The Pearl Harbor Deception
by Robert Stinnett
Independent Institute
December 7, 2003
http://www.antiwar.com/orig2/stinnett1.html

Two questions about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor have ignited a controversy that has burned for 60 years: Did U.S. naval cryptographers crack the Japanese naval codes before the attack? Did Japanese warships and their commanding admirals break radio silence at sea before the attack?

If the answer to both is "no," then Pearl Harbor was indeed a surprise attack described by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a "Day of Infamy." The integrity of the U.S. government regarding Pearl Harbor remains solid.

But if the answer is "yes," then hundreds of books, articles, movies, and TV documentaries based on the "no" answer — and the integrity of the federal government — go down the drain. If the Japanese naval codes were intercepted, decoded, and translated into English by U.S. naval cryptographers prior to Pearl Harbor, then the Japanese naval attacks on American Pacific military bases were known in advance among the highest levels of the American government.

During the 60 years, the truthful answers were secreted in bomb-proof vaults, withheld from two congressional Pearl Harbor investigations and from the American people. As recently as 1995, the Joint Congressional Investigation conducted by Sen. Strom Thurmond and Rep. Floyd Spence, was denied access to a naval storage vault in Crane, Indiana, containing documents
that could settle the questions.

Americans were told of U.S. cryptographers' success in cracking pre-PearlHarbor Japanese diplomatic codes, but not a word has been officially uttered about their success in cracking Japanese military codes.

In the mid-1980s I learned that none of the hundreds of thousands of Japanese military messages obtained by the U.S. monitor stations prior to Pearl Harbor were introduced or discussed during the congressional investigation of 1945-46. Determined to penetrate the secrets of Pearl Harbor,

I filed Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests with the US Navy. Navy officials in Washington released a few pre-Pearl Harbor documents to me in 1985. Not satisfied by the minuscule release, I continued filing FOIAs.

Finally in 1993, the U.S. Naval Security Group Command, the custodian of the Crane Files, agreed to transfer the records to National Archives in Washington, D.C. In the winter of 1993-94 the files were transported by truck convoy to a new government facility built on the College Park campus of the University of Maryland inside the Washington Beltway, named Archives II. Mr. Clarence Lyons, then head of the Military Reference Branch, released the first batch of Crane Files to me in the Steny Hoyer Research Center at Archives II in January 1995.

Apparently, the pre-Pearl Harbor records had not been seen or reviewed since 1941. Though refilled in pH-safe archival boxes by Lyons' staff, some of the Crane documents were covered with dust, tightly bunched together in the boxes and tied with unusual waxed twine. Lyons confirmed the records were received from the U.S. Navy in that condition.

It took me a year to evaluate the records. The information revealed in the files was astonishing. It disclosed a Pearl Harbor story hidden from the public. I believed the story should be told to the American people. The editors of Simon & Schuster/The Free Press published Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1999.

Day of Deceit was well received by media book reviews and the on-linebooksellers, Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble.com, earning a 70 percent public approval rating. Day of Deceit continues among the top ten bestsellers in the non-fiction Pearl Harbor book category, according
to
> Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble.com.
> > About 30 percent of the reviews have discounted the book's
> revelations. The
> leaders of the dispute include Stephen Budiansky, Edward Drea, and
David Kahn,
> all of whom have authored books or articles on code breaking. To
bolster their
> pre-Pearl Harbor theories, the trio violated journalistic ethics and
distorted
> the U.S. Navy's pre-Pearl Harbor paper trail. Their efforts cannot be
ignored.
> The trio has close ties to the National Security Agency, the overseer
of U.S.
> naval communications files. Kahn has appeared before NSA seminars.
The NSA has
> not honored my FOIA requests to disclose honorariums paid the seminar
> participants but has released records that confirm Kahn has been a
> participant.
> > Immediately after Day of Deceit appeared in bookstores in 1999, NSA
began
> withdrawing pre-Pearl Harbor documents from the Crane Files housed in
Archives
> II. This means the government decided to continue 60 years of Pearl
Harbor
> censorship. As of January 2002, over two dozen NSA withdrawal notices
have
> triggered the removal of Pearl Harbor documents from public inspection.
> > The number of pages in the withdrawn documents appears to be in
> the hundreds. Among the records withdrawn are those of Admiral Harold R.
> Stark, the 1941 Chief of Naval Operations, as well as crypto records
authored
> by Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, the chief cryptographer for the
Pacific
> Fleet at the time of Pearl Harbor. Under the Crane File transfer
agreement
> with National Archives, NSA has the legal right to withdraw any
document
> based on national defense concerns.
> > Concurrent with the NSA withdrawals, Budiansky, with the aid of
Kahn and
> Drea, began a two-year media campaign to discredit the paper trail
of the U.S.
> naval documents that form the backbone of Day of Deceit. One of the
most
> egregious examples of ethical violations appeared in an article by
Kahn
that
> article, Kahn attempted to bolster his contention that Japanese
admirals and
> warships observed radio silence while en route to attack American
> Pacific bases. Kahn broke basic journalism ethics and rewrote a U.S.
> Naval
> Communication Summary prepared by Commander Rochefort at his crypto
> center
> located in the Pearl Harbor Naval Yard.
> About 1,000 intercepted Japanese naval radio messages formed the
> basis of
> each Daily Summary written by Rochefort and his staff. The Japanese
> communication intelligence data contained in the messages was
> summarized and
> delivered daily to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of
> the
> Pacific Fleet. Rochefort's summary of November 25, 1941 (Hawaii time)
> was not
> to Kahn's liking. It revealed the Commander Carriers of the Imperial
> Japanese
> Navy were not observing radio silence but were in "extensive
> communications"
> with other Japanese naval forces whose admirals directly commanded
> the
> forces involved in the Pearl Harbor attack. Because of the
> International
> Dateline, the "extensive communications" mentioned in the summary
> took place
> on November 26, 1941, Japan time, the exact day the Japanese carrier
> force
> began its journey to Hawaii.
> In its entirety the Rochefort summary reads: "FOURTH FLEET - CinC.
> FourthFleet is still holding extensive communications with the
> commander
> SubmarineFleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His
> other
> communications are with the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Base Forces."
> The meaning of the summary is unequivocal: The commanders of the
> powerful Japanese invasion, submarine, and carrier forces did not
> observe
> radio silence as they maneuvered toward U.S. bases in Hawaii, Wake,
> and Guam
> Islands in the Central Pacific. Instead they used radio transmitters
> aboard
> their flagships and coordinated strategy and tactics with each other.
> The summary corroborates earlier findings by Pulitzer
> Prize-winning historian John Toland. In the late 1970s, Toland
> interviewed
> personnel and obtained U.S. naval documents from San Francisco's
> Twelfth Naval
> District that disclosed that the "extensive communications" were
> intercepted
> by the radio direction finders of the U.S. Navy's West Coast
> Communications
> Intelligence Network. Doubleday published Toland's account in 1982 as
> Infamy:
Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath.

Yet in his NYRoB article Kahn deleted portions of the Rochefort summary in the middle of the first sentence, profoundly diminishing its significance. Kahn's version: "Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet."

Kahn violated basic journalism rules by deleting crucial words and not using ellipsis to indicate a deletion. When I cited these ethical violations to the editors of the NYRoB, Kahn offered an excuse and implied that Rochefort's summary was too long. "I had to condense my review," he wrote.

Kahn probably believes his deletion was insignificant because he denies that the Commander Carriers were involved in the Pearl Harbor attack. "The force that attacked Hawaii was not that of the Commander Carriers but the First Air Fleet," he wrote in his reply to my Letter to the Editor of the NYRoB (February 8, 2001). Kahn revealed his ignorance of the Japanese naval organization. The First Air Fleet operated under Commander Carriers, that is, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, who was in charge of the entire Hawaii Operation.

Captain A. James McCollum, USNR (Ret), who served in San Francisco's Twelfth Naval District intelligence office (and later on the intelligence staff of Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz) accused Kahn of committing "journalistic crimes." "That critic, David Kahn, seems to have deliberately distorted some facts and even altered quotations...," McCollum wrote in his letter to the editors of the NYRoB on February 14, 2001. The letter was never published.

December 7, 1941 - 'a day which will live in infamy'

http://disc.server.com/discussion.cgi?disc=149495;article=47208;title=APFN